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INVESTOR  BEHAVIOR  IN  THE OCTOBER  1987 STOCK  MARKET  CRASH: 
THE CASE  OF JAPAN 
ABSTRACT 
In a questionnaire  survey  we asked  Japanese  institutional  investors  to 
recall what they thought  and did during  the worldwide  stock market  crash  in 
October,  1987.  The results  confirm  that  the drop in  U.  S.  stock  prices  was 
the primary  factor on their minds,  and other news stories  in  the United 
States dominated  Japanese  news stories.  A comparison  with an earlier  survey 
of  U.  5.  institutional  investors  at the time  of the crash  (Shiller  [1987]) 
shows  a remarkable  similarity  between  Japanese  and U. S. institutional 
investors  in a number  of attitudinal  and  behavioral  dimensions.  The results 
suggest  that events  in the United  States  were the proximate  cause  of the 
crash in  Japan,  but that the tranamiasion  mechanism  of  the crash  was very 
similar  in both countries. 
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JAPAN The main shortcomings of the present survey  are that  it  was undertaken 
four months  after the crash  and that the sample size is only 52.  We think, 
however,  that in an  event  ao dramatic as the biggest  stock market  crash  in 
history, memories will still he sufficiently fresh that the responses will 
be  useful.  Moreover,  a sample size of 52 is large enough  to  produce 
reasonably  small standard errors on  estimated proportions 
-  generally in the 
4 percentage  point  to 7 percentage point range; small  enough  to permit us to 
make some broad  conclusions. 
Timins of Events 
The Tokyo Stock  Exchange (Tokyo SE) closes each  day before  the New  York 
Stock Exchange  (NYSE) opena.  Thus,  the Japanese market  could not react to 
the 13.  5.  crash on  Monday  October 19 until Tuesdsy October 20.  For this 
reason, October 20 was aubatituted  in Japan for October  19 on  questions 
asked of  U.  S.  investors  in Shiller  (1987]. 
To get a rough  ides of the relative stock movements  of  the NYSE and Tokyo 
SE around  the craah, we plot the Dow  Jones  Industrial Average  and the Nikkei 
Average Tuesday September  1 through Wednesday  December 23 in Figure l.  We 
can see from  the figure that while  the decline of  stock prices on  the NYSE 
began Monday  October  5,  the Tokyo SE did not show  any drop until Monday 
October  19,  and then  only a relatively small one.  The New York  Stock 
Exchange experienced  a 10.8% drop between Monday  October  5  and  Thursday 
October  15, but the Tokyo SE  did not respond to it.  Thua, the market 
decline in Japan  essentially began  on Tuesday October  20,  the date we 
singled out in  the survey  questions. 
3The Nikkei  average  is based on an  arithmetic  average of  prices of 225 
stocks.  The Nikkei  average is commonly called  the "Nikkei Dow Jones." 
2 News Stories 
In order to find what  news the Japanese  investors reacted  to,  we  selected 
a list of  news stories and asked respondents  to rate their importance,  as 
they remember judging it on  October  20,  1987,  on  a one to seven scale  (one 
completely  unimportant,  seven very important).  The respondents  were told 
'Please tell how important y  then thought these were, and  not  how others 
thought about  them." 
The news items are shown in Table  2.  They may be classified  into four 
categories:  1) news about the Japanese stock price movement,  2) news about 
the U.  S.  stock price movement,  3)  other news  of  Jspsn,  and 4) other news 
of the U.  S. 
What the Japmnese investors thought most important was the news of the  - 
crash of  New York  Stock Exchange on  October  19.  Fully 87% of the 
respondents  rated this "very important";  the sverage of the snswers is 
6.727.  The drop in the morning October 20 in  Tokyo  SE comes next.  65% of 
the respondents  answered that this wss "very important"  (the average of the 
answers is 6.266). 
The other  items were rated lower.  Jspsnese  investors thought that the 
price drops of the preceding week in  the NYSE  were more important  than the 
slight drop in Tokyo Stock Exchange on  October  19.  The  aversges of the 
answers to the news of  "Drop in  the New  York  and other  Stock Prices that 
preceded October 19"  is 5.257, while  the news of  Drop in the Tokyo SE on 
October  19"  is 4.608.  On  the contrsry,  (or similarly?)  the U.S.  investors 
rsted the drops of their own market more important than that of the foreign 
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- market  (  5.235  vs. 4.776).  This is reasonable since  the Tokyo SE did not 
show any decline in  the preceding week  except  the 2.3% drop on  October  19. 
Comparing  the news  of the U.S. and  Japan,  Japanese investors  rated the 
former higher  than  the latter. For example,  "The news that Takesita was 
nominated as the new president  of  Liberal Democratic  Party on  October 20" 
was rated  lower than the news of "U.S. attack  on Iranian oil station October 
19" (2.434 vs. 3.317). 
Interestingly,  the news on  the U. S.  economy were rated higher by the 
Japanese investors  than by the U.  S.  investors.  For example, the news of 
the U.S. trade deficits,  the rise of prime  rate and U.S.  treasury bill 
yields,  and Treasury Secretary Baker's suggestion  on  the exchange rate were 
rsted more than five on  average by  Japanese  investors, while U.S. investors 
rated most of  them around four.  Moreover many of the U.S.  economic news 
stories were  raced  higher  than the news of the stock prices  of the preceding 
week  by the Japanese investors. 
We asked a question  that "Did  you think the crash would  influence the 
Japanese  market?"4  Of  our respondents, 98.2% answered  that they thought 
then that Japanese  stock prices would  go down.  Only 1.8% (one person) 
thought that the drop of  Tokyo Stock Exchange would be  larger  than that  of 
NYSE. This also seems to support the notion  that the Japanese  stock market 
crash was caused  by the United States crash. 
Two interpretations  are possible to these results.  One is to regard  them 
as general features of  the Japanese  investors and to suppose that the Tokyo 
4This  question immediately  followed a question asking  the date and time 
when respondents  first heard of  the crash on  the NYSE.  All but two of  the 
resondents  had heard by  8:00 a.  m. JST.  Thus,  in  context, this question 
may be interpreted  as asking for the opinion the respondent held  before  the 
crash in  the Tokyo market. 
4 SE  is dependent  on the NYSE.  Considering  thst Tokyo SE by  some measures  is 
now about as large  as NYSE, however,  the unidirectional  causation  is hard to 
believe. 
The other  interpretation  is to  regard  the dependency  of  Tokyo SE on the 
NYSE  as specific to  the current crash.  A stock market  crash is apparently  a 
unique event  in  investors minds, not just a bigger version  of smaller price 
movements.  The reasons the event occurred in  the U.S. in  the United  States 
are not clear,  though the conclusion in  Shiller  [1987]  was that a self- 
amplifying  sequence  of reactions to price  declines played a role; the 
reaction each  day to price declinea of the previous day, starting the 
previous week.  The crash in the Tokyo  SE seemed to have no apparent toots 
in  their own economy, and there were no significant  price declines  in Japan 
the preceding  week.  This may explain why the Japanese investors rated  the 
news in  the U.S. very  high  in  the survey.  However, the latter 
interpretation  does not requite that  this is always true.  If a crash 
happens autonomously  in  Japan  and spreads to the NYSE, the U.S. investors 
would rate the news in Japan very  high. 
Attitude  and Behavior Comparisons 
-  U.  S.  and Japan 
In the previous survey of  U. S. institutional investors  (Shiller [1987]) 
it was concluded  that important factors in the crash were investors' 
impressions of  the psychology  of  other  investors.  The theory moat common 
among investors was  that investors had caused  the market  to be  overpriced 
and vulnerable  to a panic, much  like the one that occurred  in the United 
States in  October 1929. 
Respondents  were  asked  "Which of  the following better  describes your theory about the detline: a theory about investor psychology,  [or]  a theory 
about  fundamentals such  as profits or interest rates?" (See Table  3 for 
questions  discussed in this section.)  Of  Japanese investors,  22.2% chose 
investor psychology.  This is even  higher  than the percent answering  yea 
Song  U. 5;  institutional investors  (64.0%). 
Of  the Japanese respondents,  83.6% answered that they  thought just before 
the crash  that the market was overpriced  relative to fundamental values. 
This is very  close  to the result with  the U.S.  institutional investor,  where 
84.3% said they thought the market  overpriced.  Apparently  the average 
institutional  investor in  both  Japan  and the United  States  thought that 
Qthx  investors were too optimistic  about share values.  This is consistent 
with the result that only 29.1% of the Japanese  respondents  and 22.2%  of the 
U. S. respondents  thought that  they were  bullish and optimiatit  relative  to 
the other investors. 
Japanese investors were remarkably  similar in  their willingnesa  to admit 
that they had experienced  "contagion  of fear" on  the day of  the crash. Of 
Japanese  investors, 41.8%  said yea, of  U.  S.  investors, 41.3%  said yea.  The 
question  "Roughly how many  people  did  you  talk  to  about the atock market on 
[the day of the crash]?" also yielded similar numbers  in the both countries 
(Japan 15.4 vs. U.S.19.?).  Thus,  the interpersonal communication  that is 
necessary  for contagion of  fear was present in roughly equal amounts  in both 
•tountries.  Interestingly about  20% of the respondents in  Japan said they 
thought or talked  about the events of  1929 (which are most  likely  to  he U. 
S.  and  not Japanese events) in  the few days before  the crash; the number  is 
even  higher  than  that of  the U.S.  institutional investors,  which  is 53.2%. 
We asked investors directly about anxiety levels as expressed  by  explicit 
6 symptoms.  Anxiety  levels  in Japan were  comparatively  low the week  before 
the crash and over the weekend before  the crash, as one might  expect  given 
the absence of  major stock price movements  in  Japan then.  On October 20 
anxiety  levels  in Japan were fully comparable  to those described by U.  S. 
investors.  Japanese  investors were  somewhat  less confident  of their ability 
to  predict when  a rebound would  occur than  were  U.  S.  investors. 
Only around 11% of  the Japanese investors had a policy  of limiting  bases 
at the point  of  October  20.  This number  is quite  similar to that in  the 
U.S..  While portfolio  insurance appears to be very  important  in the United 
States,  the overall impact of  all loss-limiting policies appears to be 
roughly equally important  in the two countries. 
Respondents  were also aaked whether  they had abandoned  a policy  of 
investing  for the long term  just before  the crash:  10.9% of the Japanese 
investors answered  yes.  The  number  is not significantly different  from  that 
of the U.S. institutional  investors (6.6%). 
Interpretation  and Conjectures 
What is most striking in  the survey  data of the Japanese  institutional 
investors  is that the answers are very  similar to those of the U.S.  insti- 
tutional  investors.5  The comparisons of the U.  S.  and Japan  at  the time of 
the market  crash show  that there are today not only  world  markets:  there is 
also a world  market culture: patterns of  behavior, outlook and communica- 
tions,  that transcends national boundaries. 
We think that it is a strong suggestion  of these results that the 
51n fact, according  to the surveys, we can say that the U.S. 
institutional  investors are closer in  behavior to the Japanese  institutional 
investors  than they  are to  the U.S.  individual investors. proximate  tause of  the crash came from the United  States.  A scenario of the 
Tokyo  SE on  October  20 may  be as follows:  Investors anticipated that  a 
sharp drop  would  occur in  Tokyo  SE on  October 20 when  they  got up and heard 
the news of  the crash of  NYSE, and focused on  the movement of  the stock 
price  in  the morning.  The big question on their minds  that morning was 
about Japanese  investor pyschology:  how investors  in the Japanese market 
would  react to the U.  S.  stock market  crash.  Considerable  anxious 
interpersonal  communications  on this issue took  place  among Japanese 
institutional  investors that day. 
What  is interesting is that the Tokyo market  did not respond to the 
decline of NYSE  in  the preceding weeks,  although  the decline was not small 
compared  with the declines in  previous history  (394 points  for two weeks) 
Perhaps  the channel of  the contagion across national boundaries  of a market 
decline  is in  operation only when it becomes of  considerable  size.6 
In  Tsutsui  [1988] it was found that Cranger causality  tests with nine 
lags between  the NYSE (Dow Jones Industrial Average)  and the Tokyo  SE 
(Nikkei Average)  in  nominal terms showed strong evidence of  bidirectional 
causality with  daily data  April  1,  1985 to October 13, 1987.  The evidence 
for causality  was stronger from  the NYSE to the Tokyo SE than  in  the reverse 
direction.  When the sample was shortened  to April 1 1.985 to October  13, 
1987  (excluding the crash)  there is still evidence of  bidirectional 
•  causality,  though  now causality from  the Tokyo SE to the NYSE  was only just 
significant  at  the 5%  level. 
6lnstitutional  investor behavior  on  ordinary days may show  less active 
communications  and less concern with  market  psychology;  see Pound  and 
Shiller  [19871. 
8 November  Decorober 
Figure 1.  1!.  S.  and Japan Stock Priceo, September 1  -  December 23,  1987. 
Note: the averages shown are  the Sow Jones industrial.  Average and the Nikkei 
Average.  Plotted are closing prices for those days in which both the Tokyo 
SE and the NYSE were open.  The longer tick marks correspond  to Fridays. 
Note that the nomber of data points in each week varies from three to five. 
depending on holidays  in the two countries. 
21 
20 





4  l1  18  23  2  9  16  23  319  8  13  20  27  4  11  IS 
October Table  1  Sample Composition 
# sent  #  returned 
Big banks (city and long-term  credit  banks)  12  3 
Intermediate size and smaller banks 
(regional  banks, mutual banks, 
credit associations and others)  52  20 
Life insurance companies  11  7 
Consultant companies and credit  banks  11  5 
Enterprise corporations  27  10 
Others *  1  0 
Unknown  -  7 
Total  114  52 
* 
The unknown category consists of those  who did not answer the question 
about their affiliation. 
10 Table 2  Importance  of News Items 
"Please tell us how important each  of  the following news item was to you 
personally  on  October  20 in  your evaluation of  stock market prospects. 
Please rate  them  on  a one to seven acale, I indicating that the item  was 
completely  unimportant, 4 indicating  that it waa of  moderate importance,7 
indicating  that it was very important. Please tell how important yp  then 
felt these were, and not how  othera  thought about them." 
a.  Drop in Japanese Stock Prices on  October 19  (0.22) 
b.  Drop in the New York and other Stock Prices 
that preceded  October 19  (0.22) 
c.  Crash of  the London and New  York  markets October  19.  6.73  (0.11) 
d.  The drop in  the Japanese Stock prices  the morning 
of October  20.  kll  (0.20) 
e.  The news that Takesita was nominated  as the new 
president  of  Liberal Democratic  Party on  October  20.  (0.20) 
f.  The news that Yen was appreciated 
to $  1.DO14D.4O yen.  L].Z  (0.25) 
g.  The news of  the decrease of the price of 
land in  October.  L1 (0.19) 
h.  U.  S.  Trade deficit figures announced 
Wednesday  October  14,  1987.  Lj (0.18) 
[U.  S.:  4.21  (0.09)] 
i.  U.  S.  Producer Price Index figures 
announced Friday October  16,  1987.  (0.20) 
[U.  S.:  3.17  (0.08)] 
j.  The  rise of  US prime rate on  October  15.  j  (0.17) 
[U.  S.:  3.95  (0.10)] 
k.  US treasury bond  yields  reached 10.5%.  Lfl  (0.14) 
[U.  S.:  5.57  (0.08)] 
I.  Baker suggested  that the dollar  should slip further.  (0.19) 
[U.  S.:  4.84  (0.10)] 
m.  U.S. attack  on Iranian oil station.  4.33  (0.18) 
[U.  S.:  3.32  (0.10)] 
Note:  figures in  parentheses  are standard errors. 
11 Table  3  Investor Attitudes  snd Behavior 
1.  Which of  the following  better  describes your theory  of the decline? 
A  theory  about  investor psychology.  72.7%  (7.0%)  [U.  S.  64.0%  (2.7%)] 
A  theory  about  fundamentals,  27.3%  (7.0%)  [U.  S.  36,0%  (2.7%)) 
such  as  profits  or interest rates. 
2.  Did you have the sense, just  before  the crash,  that the market  was 
overpriced  relative  to fundamental value?  (Try hard to remember  what  you 
thought  then.)  83.6% yes  (5.0%) 
[U.  S.: 84.3% yes  (2.2%)) 
3.  Do you think  you were  bullish  and optimistic,  relative  to other 
investors,  before  the crash?  29.1% yes  (6.1%) 
[U.  S.: 22.2%  yes  (2.5%)) 
4.  Do you think you  may have  personally  experienced  contagion  of fear from 
other people  shortly before or on October  20?  41.8%  yes  (6.9%) 
[U.  S.  [October 14-19)  41.3%  yes  (3.0%)[ 
5. Roughly  how many  people  did you talk  to about  the stock  market  on 
October  20?  15.4  (2.2) 
[U.  S.  [October 19[  19.7  (1.0)) 
6.  Do you remember  thinking or talking about Great  Depression  of 1929 on 
the few days before  October 20?  69.1% yes  (6.3%) 
[U.S  .  [events  of  1929; October  19]  53.3% yes  (3.0%)) 
7.  On which  of the following  dates did  you experience  any unusual  symptoms 
of  anxiety  (difficulty  concentrating,  tightness  in  chest,  irritability,  or 
rapid pulse)  regarding  the stock market? 
October  14-16  3.6%  (2.5%)  [U.  5,  13.1%  (2.0%)] 
17-18  1.8%  (1.8%)  [U.  5.  15.0%  (2.2%)[ 
19  10.9%  (4.2%)  [U.  5.  43.1%  (3.0%)] 
20  41.8% (6.7%)  [U. 5.  30.3%  (2.8%)] 
21-23  30.9%  (6.2%)  [U.  S.  29.2%  (2.7%)] 
8.  Did you think at any point  of time on October 20 that you had a pretty 
good idea  when a rebound was to  occur?  11.3% yes  (4.3%) 
[U.  5.  [October 19]: 28.0% yes  (2.7%)] 
9.  Did  you have,  as of October 20, a  policy  of  holding  losses to a certain 
amount?  (For example,  did  you decide  the timing  of sell by some  portfolio 
insurance  measure  such  as stop loss orders?)  11.9%  yes  (4.4%) 
[U.  5.:  10.2%  yes  (1.8%)] 
10. Did you abandon  a  policy  of  investing  for the long  term (for example,  a 
policy  based  on  fundamentals)  shortly before  October  20? 
10.9%  yes  (4.2%) 
[U.  5.  [October 19]:  6.5% yes  (1.5%)] 
12 APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE  WITH  TABUlATED  RESULTS 
SURVEY CONCERNING  THE STOCK MARKET  DROP 
)% of  the item  the number  of the answers) 
[weighted  average of items,  the total # of the answers] 
(Comparable  U.  S.  results  shown with  letters US) 
Instructions 
This questionnaire  should  take no more than ten minutes  of  your time if you 
skip the optional  essay questions.  We would  appreciate  it if you answer  the 
optional  questions  too.  We will send  a report on  this survey  to those who 
participate. 
The purpose  of this questionnaire: 
October  19, 1987,  on the "black Monday,"  the New York Stock Exchange  fell 
more than  ever  before  in history.  The New York  Dow Jones  fell 508 points  in 
one day.  The crash occurring  in  the NYSE spread  to other foreign  exchanges 
all over the world.  The Nikkei  Average  fell  14.9% on  October  20, which  is 
unprecedented  in  history. 
The purpose  of this questionnaire  is to know  how investors  looked  at  the 
situation  and what  they thought and how they  behaved.  Please try to 
remember  your personal  experience  then.  Please  give  answers by circling 
numbers.  There  are also some essay questions. 
The survey  is anonymous.  The results are used only  for academic  research 
and not for any commercial  purposes.  Individual  answers will not be 
announced.  Please finish  what  you can of this survey  and return  it,  even if 
you cannot  answer  all questions. 
13 O  Are you a fund manager? 
[CIRCLE  ONE NIJMBER] 
1YES  2ND 
(94.5%;  52,  5.5%;  3)  [1.055,55] 
If no,  please pass this questionnaire to a fund manager] 
Have you been aware of the  stock  market drops noted above? 
[CIRCLE  ONE NUMBER] 
1YES  2ND 
(98.2%;54,  0%;O,  ?—l.8%;l) 
[1.00,54]  US:  individual [1.011,596] 
2 When did you hear that there  were above-average stock  market drops 
on October 20 in the Japanese market? 
Date  [20.00,54]  lime [9:08,53] 
2-1 When did you first  hear the  crash in New York stock exchange market 
on October  19? 
Day: 
Approximate time: 
(October 19= 4;  7.3%,  October 20=51;  92.?%) 
October 19,  21:00,  23:00,  night, 6:00) 
(October  20,  6:00=21,  6:00-7:00=9,  ?:OO=14, 8:00=1,  10:00=1, 11:00=1, 
morning=3, 0:00=1] 
Date  ]19.92?,55]  US  [19.00,280] 
lime  [6:11(Oct.20)JSI  — 16:1l(Oct.19)EDI,49] 
US  [10.533  EDI,l?9] 
2-2 Did you think that the crash would influence  to the Japanese market? 
1  Stock price in Japan would go down.  (96.4  %;53) 
2  Stock price in Japan would go down more than in the US.  (1.8 %;1( 
3  No influence.  (1.8 %;l} 
4  Stock  price will  go  up.  (0 %;0) 
[1.055,  55] 
14 3  Roughly how many people  did you talk  to about  the stock market  on 
October  20? 
Number  of people 
[15.434, 53]  US [19.681,274] 
4  How many times did you check  stock prices  on  October  20? 
Number  of times 
[12.57,37]  US [34.965,204] 
other  answers: 
[many—S  always—6,  a couple  of  times—l  infinityl, all day long  —l,etc[ 
5  Did you buy or sell  either  stocks  or stock  futures on October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  I  bought  (mostly)  2  I sold (mostly)  3  I did  not sell or buy 
[lO.9%;6,  1O.9%;6,  78.2%;43[ 
[2.673,55]  US [2.512,277] 
6  Did you have,  as of  October  20, a policy  of  holding  losses to a certain 
amount?  (For example,  did you decide  the timing of sell 
by some portfolio  insurance  measure  such as stop loss orders?) 
[CIRCLE ONE NIJMBER[ 
1  YES  2NO 
[1O.9%;6,  89.l%;49[ 
[1.891,55]  US [1.898,275] 
7  If  yes,  had you adopted  this policy  shortly before or on October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2NO 
[66.7%; 4,  16.7%;  1,  7— 16.7%;  1] 
[1.200,5]  US(October  19)  [1.720,50] 
8  If yes to the question  6,  could  you give  the time you adopted  the policy 
and the reason? 
days before 
(0 days—I person,  2—1,  4—1,  6—1, 20—1,  90—1] 
[20.333,6]  US [185.0,12] 
the reason  (optional) 
9  Did you abandon a policy  of  investing  for the long term  (for example 
a policy  based  on the fundamentals)  shortly before  or on October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2N0 
[1O.9%;6,  85.5%;47,  ?— 3.6%;2[ 
[1.887,53] US [1.935,275] 
10 If  yes,  could you describe  the date  you made the change  in policy  and the 
reason  for the change? 
days  before 
C? days—i  person,  15=1,  20—1,  30—1, 50—1,  60—1], 
[30.333,6]  US [29.2,21] 
the reason  (optional) 
is 11 Please  tell  us how important  each  of the following  news  item was  to you 
personally  on October  20 in your evaluation  of  the stock marker  prospects. 
Please  rate them on a one to seven  scale,  1 indicating  that the item  was 
completely  unimportant,  4 indicating  that ic  was of  moderste  importance, 
7 indicating  that  it  was very important.  Please  tell how important  you then 
felt chase were,  and not how others  thought  about them. 
completely  Moderately  very 
important  important  important 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
a Drop in Japanese  Stock Prices on October 19  [4.608,51] 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
7.3%;4,  l.8%;l,  5.S%;3, l0.9%;6,  38.2%;21,  9.l%;5, 7.3%;4,  20.0%;ll) 
(Drop in  U.S.  Stock Prices  on October  14-16  US  [5.235,277] 
b Drop in the New York and other  Stock Prices  that preceded  October  19 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
7.3%;4,  0.0%;0,  3.6%;2,  9.l%;5, 25.5%;14,  5.5%;3,18.2%;l0,30.9%;17) 
[5.257,51] 
(Drop  in Japenese  or London  Stock  Prices that  preceded  October  19, 1987 
US [4.776,277] 
b-l  Crash  of  the London  and  New York  markets  on  October  19  [6.727,55] 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
0.0%;0,  0.0%;O, O.0%;O,  O.0%;0,  5.5%;  3,  3.6%;2,  3.6%;  2,  87.3%;48) 
c  The drop  in  the Japanese  Stock  prices  the morning of October 20 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3.6%;2,  1.8%;l,  1.8%;1,  3.6%;2,  5.5%;  3,  5.5%;3, 12.7%;  7,  65.5%;36) 
6  .266,  53] 
The 200 point  drop in the Dow the morning  of  Monday,  October  19 
US  [5.927,277] 
c-l  The news that  Takesita  was nominated  as the new president  of Liberal 
Democratic  Party on October 20  [2.434; 53] 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3.6%;2,  30.9%;17,  27.3%;15,  16.4%;9,  16.4%;  9,  l.8%;l, 0.0%; 0, 3.6%;  2) 
c-2  The news that  Yen was appreciated  to $  1.00=140.40 yen 
[4.  717,53] 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
(  3.6%;2,  7.3%; 4,  5.5%;  3,  5.5%;3,  29.l%;16,10.9%;6,l8.2%;i0,  20.0%;1l) 
c-3  The news of the decrease of the price  of land in  October  [3.667,54] 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
l.8%;l,  10.9%;  6,  10.9%;  6,  lO.9%;6, 40.O%;22,18.2%;lO,  7.3%;  4,  0.0%; 0) 
16 d  Trade deficit  figures  announced Wednesday  October  14, 1987 
?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3.6%;2,  0.0%;  0,  1.8%;  1,  l.8%;l, 2O.O%;11,  5.5%;3,  34.5%;19,32.7%J8) 
[5.736,531  US  [4.211,279] 
e  Producer  Price  Index figures  announced  Friday  October  16,  1987 
?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
)5.5%;3,  O.O%;O,  10.9%;  6,  7.3%;4, 34.5%;19,18.2%;1O,14.5%;  8,9.1%;  5) 
[4.481,52]  US  [3.170,276] 
f  The news of the US credit  balance  on  October  14 
?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
)5.5%;3,  0.0%;  0,12.7%; 7,  1O.9%;6, 47.3%;26,12.7%;  7,  7.3%;4,  3.6%;  2) 
[4.019,52] 
g  The news of  rhe rise  of US prime  rate  on October  15 
?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3.6%;2,  0.0%;  0,  1.8%;  1,  l.8%;l,2O.O%;l1,2O.O%;l1,3O.9%;17,21.8%;12) 
[5.472,53] 
Chemical  Bank raising prime  rate Thursday  October  15,  US [3.949,277]) 
h  US treasury bond yields went  up to 10.5% 
?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
)l.8%;l,  O.0%;0,  0.0%;0,  0.O%;O,16.4%;  9,12.7%;  7,38.2%;21,30.9%;17) 
[5.852,54) 
(Treasury  bond  yields  hit 10.5%  US [5.571,278] 
Baker  suggested  that  the dollar  should  slip further 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3.6%;2,  1.8%;  1,  0.0%;  0,  3.6%;2,18.2%;l0,14.5%;  8,21.8%;12,36.4%;2O) 
[5.642,53]  US [4.835,280] 
j  U.S.  attack  on Iranian oil station 
7  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
l.8%;l,  1.8%;  1,  7.3%; 4,  9.l%;5,41.8%;23,20.0%;11,12.7%;  7,5.5%;  3) 
[4.333,54]  US [3.317,278] 
k  others 
12  Suppose  that as of  October 20, 1987 the same  news  had occurred  except 
for the news of  price  drops.  Would your evaluation  of  the market  or 
decisions  to buy or sell have been  substantially  different? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2N0 
C  78.2%;  43,  20.0%;  11,  ?—l.8%;l) 
[1.204,54]  US( October  19)  [1.661,274] 
1? 13 Would your reaction  have been leaa intense  if  the crash  on October  20 
had occurred  six months ago. Of course,  the situation  other than the 
crash  was different  from that  on October  20.  - 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2ND 
38.2%;  21,  54.5%;  30,  ?=7.3%;4) 
[1.588,51]  US [1.777,274]) 
14 If  yes,  please  try to describe  how and why your reaction  would have  been 
different.  (optional) 
15  Was your thinking  on October  20 influenced  by the long-term  trend  of 
the atock  prices? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2ND 
74.5%;  41,  23.6%;  13,  ?l.8%;  1) 
[1.241,54] 
(Was your tinking  on October  19 influenced  by the stock  market  dropping 
through  a 200-day moving average  or  similar  long-term  trend line? 
US [1.668,274] 
16 Were you forced  to sell on margin  call on October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2ND 
C  0%; 0,  98.2%;  54,  7—1.8%;  1) 
[2.000,54[  US(October  19)  [1.989,278] 
17 Do you think  you may have  personally  experienced  contagion  of fear from 
other  people  shortly  before  or on October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2N0 
(41.B%;23,  50.9%;28,  7=7.3%;  4) 
[1.549,51]  US (October  14-19)  [1.597,271] 
18 Do you remember  thinking  or talking  about  Creat  Depreaaion  of 1929 on 
the few days  before  October  20? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2ND 
(69.l%;38,  27.3%;lS,  7=3.6%;  2) 
]l.283,53[  US (  events  of  1929;  October  19)  [1.467,280] 
19 Can  you remember  any specific  theory  you had about  the causes  for the 
price  decline  October  20? 
(optional) 
20 Which of the following  better  deacribes  your theory  about the declinea: 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  A  theory  about inveator  psychology 
2  A theory  about fundamentals  such  as profits  or interest  rates. 
(1= 72.7%  40,  2— 25.5%;l4,  l&2 —1.8%;  1) 
[1.259,54]  US [1.360,267] 
18 21 Did you think  at any point  of time  on October 20 that  you had a 
pretty  good idea when a rebound was to occur? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
1  YES  2NO 
10.9%;  6,  85.5%;  47,  ?= 36%  2) 
[1.887,53)  US(October  19)  [1.720,279] 
22 If  yes,  what  made you think  that you knew when a rebound  would  occur? 
(optional) 
23 On which  of the following  dates  did you experience  sny unusual 
symptoms  of anxiety  (difficulty  concentrating,  tightness  in chest, 
irritability,  or rapid  pulse) regarding  the stock  market? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
1 October  14-16  (0.036; 2,55)  US  [0.131,274] 
2  17-18  (0.018; 1,55)  US [0.150,274) 
3  19  (0.109; 6,55)  US [0.431,274) 
4  20  )0.4l8;23,55)  US [0.303,274] 
5  21-23  (0.309;17,55)  US [0.292,274) 
24 What is your age? 
ACE  [42.7,53)  US  [individual — 55.03,570] 
Sex? 
sex  )male—100%,53)  US [individual  male '—91.6%  570) 
Experience  as a fund  manager  ? 
[4.53 yeara,  53) 
25 What is the  total amount  of your investment? 
[51.5 billion  Yen — 400 Million  $, 28] 
26 What  was the change in  your holdings  in 1987  of stocks  (in terms  of 
number  of shares  or contracts  not values)  between each  of the following 
dates(  at close  of  market) 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
Holdings  No  Holdings 
Increaaed  Change  Decreased 
1  2  3 
a  between September  12 and October  12  [1.981,53)  US (mdiv)  [1.916,383) 
1  2  3 
(27.3%;  15, 43.6%;24,  25.5%l4,  ?—3.6%;2) 
b between October  12 and October  19  [2.075,53)  US (mdiv)  [2.054,383) 
1  2  3 
12,7%;  7,  63,6%;  35, 20.0%;  11,  ?'—3.6%;2) 
c between October  19 and October  20  [2.222,45)  US (mdiv)  )2.046,383) 
1  2  3 
0.0%;  0, 63.6%;  35, 18.2%;  10,  ?—18,2%;l0) 
d  October  20-21  [2.064, 47) 
1  2  3 
5.5%;  3, 69.1%;  38, 10,9%;  6,  7—14.5%;  8) 
19 e  October  22 and later  in week  [2.041,49] 
1  2  3 
9.1%;  5,  61.8%;  34, 16.4%;  9,  ?=12.7%;  7) 
cf.  Between October  20 and later in week  US (indiv)Tl.924,383[ 
27 How much is your amount  of  purchase  and selling  in a year compared 
with your  total  fund (Turnover  rate)? 
times 
[2.91 times, 40] 
(How many times  ayear  do you normally  trade? 
Number 
US [283.8,155] 
28 Do you think you were  bullish  and optimistic,  relative  to other 
investors,  before  the crash? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
1  YES  2NO 
(29.1%; 16,  69.1%;  38,  ?=  1.8%;  1) 
[1.704,54]  US [1.778,266] 
29 Did you have the sense just  before  the crash  that the market  was 
overpriced  relative  to fundamental  value?( Try hard to remember  what  you 
thought then.) 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  YES  2ND 
(83.6%; 46,  14.5%;  8,  ?-  1.8%;  1) 
[1.148,54]  US [1.157,267] 
3D Do you think  that the market  is at a moderate  level  relative  to 
fundamentals  after  the crash? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER] 
1  high  2  moderate  3  low  4  hard to evaluate 
(9.l%;5,  l2.7%;7,  25.5%;14,  50.9%;28) 
[2.346,26] 
31 What  do you  predict  of the stock prices  from  now on?  # of answers55 
up  unchanged  down  no idea 
3-months  later  (8O.O%;44,  3.6%;2,  9.l%;5,  3.6%;  2,  ?'=3.6%;2) 
6  (SO.9%;28,  12.7%;?,  l8.2%;1D,  12.7%;  7,  ?-=5.5%;3) 
1-year  later  (4D.D%;22,  5.5%,3,  25.5%,l4,  2?.3%;15,  ?1.S%;l) 
32 Do you think  that there  is some possibility  of the crash  again in 3 
months? 
1  surely  happen 
(  1.8%;  1) 
2  highly  probable  C  1.8%;  1) 
3  possible  with low probability  (56.4%;31) 
4  will not hsppen  (29.l%;l6) 
5 hard to predict  [lD.9%;  6) 
# of  answers=55 
20 33 Do you think that the crash  will happen again  after 3 months later  but 
still in the near future?  * of answers=54 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
1  surely  happen  C  5.5%;  3) 
2  highly probable  (23.6%; 13) 
3  possible with low probability  (43.6%; 24) 
4  will not happen  (14.5%;  8) 
5 hard to predict  (10.9%;  6) 
If you answered 1-3, when? 
In  years 
1 year  20,  2 years  — 11,  3 years = 2,  1-3 years  1) 
34  What will you do if the crash  happens  again? 
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
1 buy  C  20.37%;  11)  * of answers—54 
2  sell 
(  3.70%;  2) 
3 no idea  C  75.93%;  41) 
Comments: 
Thank  you very much 
Please fill out the  following  if you don't  mind.  This enables  us to  send 
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